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COMMENTS
THE ROLE OF NEGLIGENCE IN SECTION 3-405
OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE:
OWENSBORO NATIONAL BANK V. CRISP
INTRODUCTION
Section 3-405 of the Uniform Commercial Code" (Code)
adopts the common law impostor and fictitious payee doc-
trines as exceptions to the general rule that forged indorse-
ments are ineffective to pass title to an instrument. Under
this section, an indorsement made by one other than the
named payee nevertheless will be effective where the drawer
was induced to issue the instrument by the fraudulent misrep-
resentations of an impostor2 or where a drawer, his agent or
employee issued an instrument intending the payee to have no
interest therein.3 The rationale underlying the impostor and
U.C.C. § 3-405 states:
(1) An indorsement by any person in the name of a named payee is effec-
tive if
(a) an impostor by use of the mails or otherwise has induced the
maker or drawer to issue the instrument to him or his confederate
in the name of the payee; or
(b) a person signing as or on behalf of a maker or drawer in-
tends the payee to have no interest in the instrument; or
(c) an agent or employee of the maker or drawer has supplied
him with the name of the payee intending the latter to have no
such interest.
(2) Nothing in this section shall affect the criminal or civil liability of the
person so indorsing.
U.C.C. references are to the 1972 Official Text. For the sake of uniformity, refer-
ences to particular state statutes equivalent to specific U.C.C. counterparts will be
cited by U.C.C. section numbers only.
2 U.C.C. § 3-405(1)(a). In the interest of simplicity, the "maker or drawer" will
hereinafter be referred to as the "drawer."
3 U.C.C. §§ 3-405(1)(b), (c). The traditional fictitious payee situation is that con-
templated by § 3-405(1)(b), in which the drawer himself issues the check to one who
is to take no interest in it. See U.C.C. § 3-405, comment 3, for examples of this situa-
tion. Section 3-405(1)(c) contemplates what is commonly referred to as a "padded
payroll scheme," in which an employee supplies the fictitious name to the drawer of
the payroll checks. See U.C.C. § 3-405, comment 4, quoted in part at note 31 infra for
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fictitious payee rules appears to be the same as that underly-
ing Code sections 3-406 and 4-406:1 that is, that the drawer,
by contributing to the forgery through his own negligence,
should not subsequently assert that forgery against the
drawee bank.5 Section 3-405, however, unlike sections 3-406
and 4-406, contains no express provision permitting the
drawer to show that the payor bank was negligent in failing to
pay the instrument in accordance with reasonable commercial
standards. Whether a negligence standard nonetheless should
operate in cases decided under section 3-405 is a question
which has split the courts in recent years. The Kentucky
Court of Appeals considered the issue in its recent decision in
Owensboro National Bank v. Crisp."
The court in Crisp took a novel approach to section 3-
405. Since Crisp involved an impostor, ' the court refused to
examples of this situatiorr. Both examples normally occur within a business establish-
ment and involve conscious wrongdoing on the part of the drawer or his agent. They
therefore will be collectively referred to as "fictitious payees" throughout this
comment.
' See J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORMs COM-
MERCLL CODE § 16-8 at 637 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as WHrrs & SuimwS].
U.C.C. § 3-406 provides:
Any person who by his negligence substantially contributes to a mate-
rial alteration of the instrument or to the making of an unauthorized signa-
ture is precluded from asserting the alteration or lack of authority against a
holder in due course or against a drawee or other payor who pays the in-
strument in good faith and in accordance with the reasonable commercial
standards of the drawee's or payor's business.
U.C.C. § 4-406 provides in pertinent part:
(2) If the bank establishes that the customer failed... to comply with the
duties imposed on the customer by subsection (1) the customer is precluded
from asserting against the bank
(a) his unauthorized signature or any alteration on the item if
the bank also establishes that it suffered a loss by reason of such
failure;
(3) The preclusion under subsection (2) does not apply if the customer
establishes lack of ordinary care on the part of the bank in paying the
item(s).
5 The party who takes the instrument for payment or deposit will not always be
the drawee bank, of course. For the purpose of simplicity, however, this party will be
denominated throughout this comment as either the "drawee" or "payor" bank.
' No. 78-CA-401-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 1979), af'd in part, rev'd in part,
No. 79-SC-684-DG (Ky. Oct. 14, 1980).
" The Court of Appeals, after some discussion of the issue, concluded that the
U.C.C. § 3-405
adopt the reasoning of any case decided under the fictitious
payee provisions of section 3-405,7 thus disregarding a signifi-
cant number of well-reasoned cases which have held that neg-
ligence is not a factor to be considered in section 3-405 cases.8
The court then determined that one who had been defrauded
by an imposter, even though negligent himself, should not be
made to bear the loss where the payor bank failed to follow
reasonable commercial standards." Although sound principles
of fairness support the approach taken by the court in Crisp,
these principles should be balanced against the Code's stated
purpose of simplifying, clarifying, and modernizing the law of
commercial transactions. 10 This comment will explore the ra-
tionale for and the soundness of distinguishing impostors
from fictitious payees and will suggest that the question of the
role of negligence in Code section 3-405 be resolved by placing
the loss on the drawer in all cases except those where the
drawer exercised care and the bank exercised none.
I. IMPOSTORS AND FICTITIOUS PAYEES As SEPARATE CLASSES
A. Historical Development of the Doctrines"'
The impostor rule as it developed at common law estab-
lished the nearly uniform practice of placing the loss resulting
payee in Crisp was an impostor. On appeal, the Kentucky Supreme Court reversed as
to this issue, but affirmed in every other respect. See note 69 infra and accompanying
text for a discussion of the application of the impostor provision by both courts.
7 The court specifically referred to the decision in General Accident Fire & Life
Assurance Corp. v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., 519 S.W.2d 817 (Ky. 1975),
based on U.C.C. § 3-405(1)(c).
8 See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Marine Nat'l Exch. Bank, 371 F. Supp. 1002 (E.D.
Wis. 1974); General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Citizens Fidelity Bank &
Trust Co., 519 S.W.2d 817 (Ky. 1975); Dartmouth Nat'l Bank v. Keene Nat'l Bank,
115 A.2d 316 (N.H. 1955); Fair Park Nat'l Bank v. Southwestern Inv. Co., 541 S.W.2d
266 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976). A discussion of these cases can be found in the text accom-
panying notes 40-50 infra.
9 No. 78-CA-401-MR at 9-10.
10 "Underlying purposes and policies of this Act are (a) to simplify, clarify, and
modernize the law governing commercial transactions . . . ." U.C.C. § 1-102(2).
" Many of the concepts discussed and adopted in the following sections are ana-
lyzed at length in Abel, The Impostor Payee: or, Rhode Island Was Right: I, 1940
Wis. L. REv. 161 [hereinafter cited as Abel I] and Abel, The Impostor Payee II, 1940
Wis. L. REv. 362 [hereinafter cited as Abel II].
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from an impersonation on the drawer, the first party to deal
with the impostor. 12 Some courts reasoned that the drawer ac-
tually intended to issue the check to the person with whom he
dealt.13 Others focused on the negligence of the drawer in not
discovering the true identity of the impostor 4 or on the desir-
ability of insuring the negotiability of commercial paper.' De-
spite the wide acceptance of the rule, exceptions did emerge."
One significant exception to the strict application of the im-
postor rule appeared in those cases in which the drawer of the
instrument exercised care in attempting to identify the person
with whom he dealt, but the second deceived party (normally
a bank) did not.'7 The courts in these cases tended to place
the loss on the second victim, the only truly negligent party to
the transaction.18 Despite the development of a well-estab-
lished body of law from these impostor cases, the Negotiable
Instruments Law (N.I.L.), promulgated in 1896, did not ad-
dress the issue.19 However, most courts continued to apply the
common law impostor rule.20
12 See United States v. National Exch. Bank, 45 F. 163 (C.C.E.D. Wis. 1891);
Boatsman v. Stockmen's Nat'l Bank, 138 P. 764 (Colo. 1914); Land-Title & Trust Co.
v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank, 46 A. 420 (Pa. 1900). See generally Abel I, supra note
11.
" See Ryan v. Bank of Italy Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 289 P. 863 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1930); Robertson v. Coleman, 4 N.E. 619 (Mass. 1886). Contra, Tolman v. Amer-
ican Nat'l Bank, 48 A. 480 (R.I. 1901).
14 See Boatsman v. Stockmen's Nat'l Bank, 138 P. 764 (Colo. 1914); Land-Title
& Trust Co. v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank, 46 A. 420 (Pa. 1900).
1 Abel II, supra note 11, at 376-77.
" Courts often distinguished between face-to-face transactions and those occur-
ring through the mails. Others sometimes refused to apply the impostor rule where
the impostor was merely claiming to be the agent of another. See Note, UCC Section
3-405; Of Impostors, Fictitious Payees, and Padded Payrolls, 47 FORDHAri L. REv.
1083, 1087-89 (1979).
'7 See Cohen v. Lincoln Say. Bank, 10 N.E. 457 (N.Y. 1937); Keel v. Wynne, 187
S.E. 571 (N.C. 1936); Tolman v. American Nat'l Bank, 48 A. 480 (R.I. 1901).
'8 See generally Abel I, supra note 11, at 193-98.
19 The Negotiable Instruments Law was adopted by the Committee on Uniform
Laws and by the American Bar Association in 1896. It quickly found wide acceptance
among American jurisdictions. F. BEUTmL, BP.UEL's BRANNAN NEGOTIABLE INSTRU-
MPENTS LAW (7th ed. 1948). Though attempts were made to apply §§ 9(3), 23, and 61
of the Negotiable Instruments Law [hereinafter cited as N.I.L.] to impostor cases, it
is generally agreed that it was not applicable to such cases. Abel I, supra note 11, at
201-17.
20 Note, supra note 16, at 1087.
U.C.C. § 3-405
The fictitious payee doctrine, unlike the impostor rule,
figured prominently in the drafting of the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law. Section 9(3) of the N.I.L. restated the common
law maxim that a check issued by a drawer to the order of a
fictitious payee became bearer paper.2" Courts uniformly ap-
plied this section to situations in which the drawer intended
that the payee have no interest in the instrument22 but held it
inapplicable to the "padded payroll" cases,23 since the knowl-
edge of the employee who supplied his employer with the
fictitious name was not considered a fact known to the person
making the check payable.2' An amendment to N.I.L. section
9(3), however, provided that the knowledge element could be
supplied by the agent or employee who furnished the name of
the payee,25 indicating that no "padded payroll" exception
had been intended.
The Uniform Commercial Code was designed to revise
and clarify the law which had developed under the N.I.L.26
Consistent with the amended version of the N.I.L., the Code's
drafters included both the traditional fictitious payee and the
padded payroll cases within section 3-405.27 Despite the en-
tirely separate development of the impostor and fictitious
payee rules at common law and under the N.I.L., however, the
drafters decided that the similarities between the two doc-
trines justified including both within the same provision.
21 "The instrument is payable to bearer ... (3) when it is payable to the order
of a fictitious or nonexisting person, and such fact was known to the person making it
so payable.. . ." UNIORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 9(3).
" See Mueller & Martin v. Liberty Ins. Bank, 218 S.W. 465 (Ky. 1920); Snyder
v. Corn Exch. Nat'l Bank, 70 A. 876 (Pa. 1908).
23See United States Cold Storage Co. v. Central Mfg. Dist. Bank, 175 N.E. 825
(IlM. 1931).
24 See City of St. Paul v. Merchant's Nat'l Bank, 187 N.W. 516 (Minn. 1922);
National Sur. Co. v. National City Bank, 172 N.Y.S. 413 (N.Y. App. Div. 1918).
25The amendment added to N.I.L. § 9(3) the words "or known to his employee
or other agent who supplies the name of such payee." See Note, supra note 16, at
1090 nn.42 & 43.
" Pacific Indem. Co. v. Security First Nat'l Bank, 56 Cal. Rptr. 142, 153 n.6
(Dist. Ct. App. 1967); U.C.C. § 3-101, official comment.
27 The drafters rejected, however, the N.I.L. approach of treating the fraudu-
lently issued instrument as bearer paper. Comment 1 to U.C.C. § 3-405 states that
the instrument remains order paper and that indorsements are still necessary to its
negotiation.
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B. , Policies Affecting Allocation of the Risk of Loss
The Code approach of combining impostors and fictitious
payees within section 3-405 undoubtedly resulted from the
common elements in the two situations. In both, there is a
"discrepancy, real or nominal, between the identity of the per-
son actually dealing with the paper and of the person to
whom it purports to have been payable and by whom it pur-
ports to have been indorsed."' 28 Additionally, one may view
the two cases as closely related in that both originate in fraud.
Beyond these two similarities, however, the situations differ in
areas which are crucial in determining which party should
bear the risk of loss.
Fictitious payee cases are said to involve "unilateral im-
posture."2 9 The drawer, or his agent or employee, in supplying
the name of one who is to take no interest in the instrument,
is fully aware of the ensuing forgery. Only the payor bank is
deceived as to the identity of the indorser. Impostor cases, on
the other hand, involve a "dual imposture";30 that is to say,
both the drawer and the payor bank have been deceived as to
the identity of the payee. This dual/unilateral classification of
imposture is important in determining the culpability of the
drawer in each situation. In fictitious payee cases, the drawer
or his agent knowingly names as payee a person who ulti-
mately will take no interest in the check. There is thus a con-
scious intent on the part of the drawer or his agent to deceive
the payor bank as to the identity of the indorser. In the im-
postor cases, however, the wrongdoing on the part of the
drawer is limited to his negligence in issuing a check to one
who, in many cases, has effected a quite skillful impersona-
tion. Regardless of his degree of negligence, the drawer has no
conscious intent to deceive.
Economic considerations also justify a distinction be-
tween the two classes of "wrongdoers." Unlike the drawer in a
true impostor situation, the wrongdoer in a fictitious payee
case can almost always be found in an internal position within
28 Abel I, supra note 11, at 170.
29 Id. at 166.
30 Id.
[Vol. 69
U.C.C. § 3-405
a business organization. The Code expressly recognizes this
fact in the official comments to section 3-405(1)(c): "The prin-
ciple followed is that the loss should fall upon the employer as
a risk of his business enterprise rather than upon the subse-
quent holder or drawee."-" It is obvious that this economic
justification has no merit when the drawer is an individual
deceived by an impostor.
When section 3-405 is examined in light of its history and
policy, it is apparent that the Code's drafters, in their effort to
simplify the divergent law relating to impostors and fictitious
payees, overlooked the fundamental differences between the
two. Confusing and inconsistent case law has perpetuated the
inequities created by the Code provision. 2 An examination of
this case law will demonstrate the ways in which courts have
dealt with the question of negligence in cases involving impos-
tors and fictitious payees.
II. THE COURTS' VIEWS OF THE ROLE OF NEGLIGENCE IN
SECTION 3-405
Courts and commentators agree that section 3-405 is not
an absolute guarantee of protection to a payor bank.33 Implicit
in all provisions of the Code is the obligation on all parties to
act in "good faith. '3 4 Unlike article 2 of the Code, in which
the good faith standard includes "the observance of reasona-
31 U.C.C. § 3-405, comment 4. This comment adds in pertinent part:
The reasons are that the employer is normally in a better position to pre-
vent such forgeries by reasonable care in the selection or supervision of his
employees, or, if he is not, is at least in a better position to cover the loss by
fidelity insurance, and that the cost of such insurance is properly an ex-
pense of his business rather than of the business of the holder or drawee.
32 See generally Harbus, The Great Pretender-A Look at the Impostor Provi-
sion of the Uniform Commercial Code, 47 CIN. L. REv. 385 (1978).
33 Prudential Ins. Co. v. Marine Nat'l Exch. Bank, 371 F. Supp. 1002, 1003 (E.D.
Wis. 1974); Kraftsman Container Corp. v. United Counties Trust Co., 404 A.2d 1288,
1291 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979); Board of Higher Educ. v. Bankers Trust Co.,
383 N.Y.S.2d 508, 510-11 (Sup. Ct. 1976); Harbus, supra note 30, at 408; Note, supra
note 16, at 1105-06.
3 "Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in
its performance or enforcement." U.C.C. § 1-203. For a general discussion of the role
of good faith in the U.C.C., see 1 R. ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, § 1-203
(2d ed. 1970).
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ble commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade, '35 arti-
cle 3, lacking i definition of its own, resorts to the Code's gen-
eral provision which defines good faith as "honesty in fact."3
Cases decided under section 3-405 have uniformly recognized
this obligation of good faith on the part of the bank.3 7 "Negli-
gence," on the other hand, is a more stringent standard than
"good faith," running specifically to the observance of the rea-
sonable commercial standards of a bank's business.38 It also is
defined as the failure to use ordinary care. 9 While banks must
act in good faith, whether they also must be free from negli-
gence is unclear. The courts are in disagreement as to whether
a bank is precluded from invoking the protection of section 3-
405 when it has been negligent by failing to follow reasonable
commercial standards.
A. Cases Regarding Negligence as an Irrelevant Factor
The most frequently encountered argument for the posi-
tion that negligence is not to be considered in a section 3-405
case is based on the absence of qualifying language in the
Code provision itself. One federal district court, in Prudential
Insurance Co. v. Marine National Exchange Bank,40 noted
the "conspicuous absence" in section 3-405 of a requirement
that the paying or collecting bank exercise ordinary care.41 It
then went on to hold that where the drawer's employee had
supplied a policy holder's name to the insurer and then forged
that name on a $20,000 check, section 3-405(1)(c) applied and
rendered the question of the drawee bank's alleged negligence
immaterial.42
35 U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b). This standard is applied only to "merchants" as defined
in § 2-104(1).
S" "'Good faith' means honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned."
U.C.C. § 1-201(19).
37 See the cases cited in note 33 supra for a list of relevant source material.
" This standard is referred to in U.C.C. § 3-406. See note 4 supra for the full
text of U.C.C. § 3-406.
39 See Fair Park Nat'l Bank v. Southwestern Inv. Co., 541 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1976).
'0 371 F. Supp. 1002 (E.D. Wis. 1974); accord, Kraftsman Container Corp. v.
United Counties Trust Co., 404 A.2d 1288 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979).
"1 371 F. Supp. at 1003.
42 Id. The court also mentioned comment 4 to U.C.C. § 3-405 and the lack of
[Vol. 69
u.c.c. § 3-405
Applying the Code's impostor provision, a Texas court in
Fair Park National Bank v. Southwestern Investment Co.,43
emphasized the reasoning behind the impostor rule in fixing
the loss resulting from an impersonation on the drawer of the
draft." According to the court in Fair Park, this policy is to
"throw the loss ... on the person who dealt with the impos-
tor, and, presumably, had the best opportunity to take pre-
cautions that would have detected the fraud, rather than on a
subsequent holder who had no similar opportunity.
45
The Kentucky Court of Appeals in General Accident Fire
& Life Assurance Corp. v. Citizens Fidelity Bank and Trust
Co.46 suggested yet another justification for holding that the
drawer should bear the loss, notwithstanding the collecting
bank's negligence. The General Accident case, decided under
section 3-405(1)(c), involved an employer's attempt to recover
the loss resulting from the bank's payment of drafts bearing
indorsements forged by an employee. In affirming an order of
summary judgment for the bank, the Court expressed its view
of the reasons behind section 3-405: "It seems that the partic-
ular statutory section with which we deal is a banker's provi-
sion intended to narrow the liability of the banks and broaden
the responsibility of their customers. ' 47
The pre-Code case of Dartmouth National Bank v.
qualifying language therein.
" 541 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
44 Id. at 269-70.
4 Id. The plaintiff, itself negligent in failing to demand identification from the
transferee of the draft which it had issued, attempted to shift the loss to the collect-
ing bank. It alleged that the bank was negligent in not verifying that the named
payee had indorsed the draft. Although the court alluded both to the drawer's pre-
sumed ability to detect the fraud and to the failure of § 3-405 to impose any express
duty of ordinary care on the subsequent holder, the real reason given by the court for
its decision to disregard the collecting bank's negligence was the finality of payment
rule in Code § 3-418. Since the collecting bank was a holder in due course, payment
by the drawee bank was "final" in its favor. See also Aetna Life & Cas. Co. v. Hamp-
ton State Bank, 497 S.W.2d 80 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973). The use of § 3-418 should be
carefully restricted to those situations involving an intermediate holder in due course,
such as a collecting bank, against whom recovery is sought.
46 519 S.W.2d 817 (Ky. 1975).
', Id. at 819, citing J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 16-8 (1972).
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Keene National Bank48 suggested a view more protective of
the public interest. In Dartmouth, the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire examined other impostor cases and found that the
policy of free circulation of commercial paper was sufficient
reason in the ordinary case for placing the loss on the drawer
in an impostor situation.49 It placed one significant limitation
upon this generalization, however, by pointing out that the
loss may be properly allocated to the second victim of an im-
posture where the first victim exercised care and the second
victim exercised none.5
B. Cases Applying a Negligence Standard
The most frequently invoked rationale in cases which
have allowed a negligence standard to operate in section 3-405
is that the bank lacked the requisites for holder in due course
status.51 In Sun 'n Sand, Inc. v. United California Bank,52 the
Supreme Court of California held that the bank had notice of
an obvious irregularity when the drawer's employee attempted
"s 115 A.2d 316 (N.H. 1955).
49 Id. at 318-19.
50 Id. at 319. Numerous cases and commentators have approved of and elabo-
rated upon these justifications for excluding negligence as a factor in § 3-405 cases.
See Titan Air Cond. Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 402 N.Y.S.2d 12 (App. Div.
1978); Hicks-Costarino Co. v. Pinto, 23 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 680 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978);
Note, supra note 15, at 1109; Comment, Bills and Notes-Payees by Impersonation
and by Assumption of a Name-Drawer's Intent and Commercial Policy, 59 MICH.
L. REv. 1218, 1235 (1961).
6- U.C.C. § 3-302(1) sets forth the requirements for holder in due course status:
"(1) A holder in due course is a holder who takes the instrument (a) for value; and (b)
in good faith; and (c) without notice that it is overdue or has been dishonored or of
any defense against or claim to it on the part of any person."
The "notice" requirement of subsection (c) goes beyond mere negligence in fail-
ing to follow reasonable commercial standards. U.C.C. § 3-304(1) provides in part:
"The purchaser has notice of a claim or defense when (a) the instrument ... bears
such visible evidence of forgery ... or is otherwise so irregular as to call into ques-
tion its validity, terms or ownership.... ." Why holder in due course status makes a
difference in § 3-405 cases is not made entirely clear by the courts using the rationale.
Presumably, their thinking is that a holder in due course, free from all claims or
defenses except those real defenses in U.C.C. § 3-305, could take free from an action
for negligence. See also U.C.C. § 3-207 (a nonholder in due course who takes title
when negotiation is obtained by fraud can be subject to an action to have the negotia-
tion rescinded).
5 582 P.2d 920 (Cal. 1978).
U.C.C. § 3-405
to deposit into his own account checks naming the bank as
payee.5 3 Section 3-405, therefore, was held not to bar the
plaintiff's cause of action against the bank for negligence."
Similarly, in McConnico v. Third National Bank,55 the Su-
preme Court of Tennessee found that transactions involving
checks made payable to a corporation which were then depos-
ited into the president's personal account were "highly irregu-
lar" and constituted sufficient notice to deprive the defendant
bank of its holder in due course status.56 In Dayton, Price &
Co. v. First National City Bank,57 the collecting bank's teller
was found to have violated normal banking procedures which
required that he obtain authorization to cash certain checks.58
Here again, the court denied holder in due course status to
the bank since it had notice of the irregularity of the
transactions.59
The negligence standard is not always articulated in
terms of whether the defendant bank qualifies as a holder in
due course. In Wright v. Bank of California,6 0 a California
court found that if the drawer's loss could be shown to have
been proximately caused by the bank's lack of due care in fail-
ing to determine the authority of the person applying for a
cashier's check, section 3-405 would not bar the drawer's
cause of action. 1 The Supreme Court of Nebraska, in Trav-
elers Indemnity Co. v. Center Bank,6 2 considered the alleged
negligence of the payor bank in failing to make reasonable in-
quiry as to the authority of the drawer company's employee to
13 "The bank does not have to be especially vigilant; its agent need only read
what appears on the face of the check to be warned that a fraud may be in progress."
Id. at 937.
5, Id. In fact, the court declared that § 3-405 did not apply at all in the context
of this transaction.
05 499 S.W.2d 874 (Tenn. 1973).
56 Id. at 886.
17 22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 454 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977), aff'd per curiam, 406 N.Y.S.2d
823 (App. Div. 1978).
'8 Id. at 456-57.
Id. at 457.
10 81 Cal. Rptr. 11 (Cal. App. 1969).
61 Id. at 14. Of course it is possible to argue, as the court here seems to suggest,
that § 3-405 was never intended by its drafters to cover the peculiar facts of this case.
62 275 N.W.2d 73 (Neb. 1979).
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deposit company checks into his own account. The court
found that in this case failure to inquire was not a breach of
duty to the drawer.6 3 The court pointed out, however, that
there are cases, notwithstanding section 3-405, in which a
bank may be liable to a drawer for its negligence. Before such
negligence can arise, "there must be some showing that the
bank was either placed on such notice as to require further
investigation or acted in a manner which was commercially
unreasonable. ' '64
The reasoning used in these cases permitting the opera-
tion of a negligence standard is largely superficial. In contrast
to the "negligence as irrelevant" group of cases, which care-
fully consider the absence of qualifying language in the Code,
the Code's policy of placing the loss on the party presumably
best able to avoid the fraud, and the public's interest in the
free circulation of commercial paper, the courts in this second
group of cases simply express an attitude that the payor bank,
having been negligent or having lost its holder in due course
status, should not escape liability. While other courts and nu-
merous commentators have agreed that banks should not be
able to escape their duty to exercise ordinary care merely be-
cause the Code's impostor and fictitious payee provisions have
come into play, 5 the first court to articulate fully its justifica-
tion for such a position was the Kentucky Court of Appeals in
its recent decision in Owensboro National Bank v. Crisp."6
C. Owensboro National Bank v. Crisp
The victim of the imposture in Crisp was an aging man,
es Id. at 76.
4 Id. at 75.
65 See the cases cited at note 17 supra for illustration of this point. See also
Board of Higher Educ. v. Bankers Trust Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 508 (Sup. Ct. 1976); J.
WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 4, at 639; Harbus, supra note 32, at 409; Comment,
Allocation of Losses from Check Forgeries Under the Law of Negotiable Instruments
and the Uniform Commercial Code, 62 YALE L.J. 417, 447, 467 (1953). But cf. Leary,
Commercial Paper: Some Aspects of Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 48
Ky. L.J. 198, 222 n.54 (1960), which suggests that definite and predictable results are
desirable if they are just and correct in the great majority of cases.
66 No. 78-CA-401-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 1979), affd in part, rev'd in part,
No. 79-SC-684-DG (Ky. Oct. 14, 1980).
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Sam Crisp, who suffered from poor eyesight and arthritis.
Crisp was advised by a stranger falsely representing himself as
"Bill Carter" of Southern Construction Company that the
lightning rod on Crisp's house needed repairs. After making
the purported repairs, Carter told Crisp that the charge for
the work was $12.50. Because of his failing eyesight and ar-
thritis, Crisp permitted Carter to fill out the check. Carter
willingly complied, raising the amount to $6,212.50 after Crisp
had signed the instrument. Carter immediately cashed the
check at Crisp's bank and disappeared. Crisp then sued the
bank to have his account recredited.67
The court identified two issues in Crisp. The first in-
volved the alteration of the check from $12.50 to $6,212.50.
The court quickly held that the bank was liable for the al-
tered amount."8 The court then turned to the second issue,
the application of section 3-405's impostor provision to that
portion of the check which was otherwise properly payable.69
It first observed that the decision in General Accident 0 would
seem to dispose of the issue, since that case held that under
section 3-405(1)(c), negligence was inapplicable to the ques-
tion of the allocation of loss. The court then stated, however,
that "[tihe policies underlying that subsection [(1)(c)] are en-
tirely distinct from those underlying (1)(a)," and that "the
holding in [General Accident] is strictly limited to [its]
'7 No. 78-CA-401-MR, slip op. at 1-3 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 1979).
" Id. at 6. This part of the court's opinion was based on Code §§ 3-407(2)(a), 4-
401(2)(a) and 3-406.
" The court first considered the problem of whether this was an impostor situa-
tion at all, since "Bill Carter" had merely assumed the name and character of a ficti-
tious person, not an actual individual. It observed, however, that other courts had
applied the rule to both real and fictitious persons, and then held that the impostor
rule was applicable here as well. No. 78-CA-401-MR, slip op. at 7-8. The Supreme
Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals and reversed as to this issue. "Bill Carter"
was not an impostor, the Supreme Court reasoned, since Crisp had contracted with
Carter to do the repair work. Had the work been properly completed, Carter would
have been entitled to a check for $12.50. Having determined that Carter was not an
impostor, the Court applied Code section 3-406, the Code's general negligence provi-
sion, rather than section 3-405. (See note 4 supra for the text of section 3-406). The
Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals in all other respects. No. 79-SC-
684-DG, slip op. at 6 (Ky. Oct. 14, 1980).
70 519 S.W.2d 817, 819 (Ky. 1975). See the text accompanying note 46 supra for
a discussion of this case.
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facts. ' 71 Citing Travelers Indemnity,72 the court held that the
negligence of the bank in failing to follow reasonable commer-
cial standards 3 barred its attempt to escape liability under
section 3-405. The court recognized that Crisp was also negli-
gent in allowing himself to be duped7 4 but obviously felt that
as between the two deceived parties, the bank was in a better
position to detect the fraud. 5 Finally, the court noted that
such a holding was not inconsistent with Fair Park,"6 since
the policy underlying the impostor rule as stated in that case
was to place the loss on the party which presumably should
have the best opportunity to detect the imposture.77 Here, the
court found that presumption to have been effectively
rebutted.78
The Crisp court rejected a mechanical application of sec-
tion 3-405, choosing instead to determine, as between two
negligent parties, which was the more negligent. The court
thereby placed itself in the position of weighing the equities
between the two parties, considering such factors as the age
and physical condition of the drawer and the degree of com-
mercial reasonableness exercised by the bank. The fairness of
this approach is unassailable, but its practicability in light of
the Code's goal of simplifying the law of commercial transac-
71 No. 78-CA-401-MR, slip op. at 9.
72 275 N.W.2d 73 (Neb. 1979). See the text accompanying note 62 supra for a
discussion of this case.
7' The jury found that the bank had failed to act in accordance with reasonable
commercial standards as follows: (1) the Kentucky driver's license used by "Bill
Carter" to identify himself contained his place of employment (which valid Kentucky
driver's licenses do not); (2) the license contained a black and white picture (which
valid Kentucky driver's licenses do not); (3) the check, which had been indorsed
"Southern Construction," should have required "Carter's" check-cashing authority to
be established (it was not); (4) no attempt was made to discover anything about
"Southern Construction"; (5) "Carter" was not asked if he had an account with the
bank; and (6) no identification (needed to establish some kind of local nexus with the
bank) other than the Kentucky driver's license was requested. No. 78-CA-401-MR,
slip op. at 4, 9-10.
74 Id. at 3.
75 Id. at 9-10.
71 Fair Park Nat'l Bank v. Southwestern Inv. Co., 541 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1976). See the text accompanying note 43 supra for a discussion of this case.
7 Id. at 269-70.
7' No. 78-CA-401-MR, slip op. at 10. The court noted that under U.C.C. § 1-
201(31), Code presumptions are rebuttable.
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tions" is more difficult to accept. A more realistic solution,
one which neither defeats the Code's goal of simplicity nor re-
jects Crisp's laudable attempt at fairness, is both desirable
and feasible.
III. A SUGGESTED APPROACH TO THE ROLE OF NEGLIGENCE
IN IMPOSTOR AND FICTITIOUS PAYEE CASES
Underneath Code section 3-405 lies a fundamental as-
sumption: the drawer of the instrument in impostor and ficti-
tious payee cases is a wrongdoer. In impostor cases, the
wrongdoer is guilty of negligence in not detecting a fraudulent
impersonation. In fictitious payee cases, the drawer himself
has committed a fraud on the drawee bank by making his in-
strument payable to one whom he meant to have no interest
in it. 0 In failing to distinguish between the drawer in an im-
postor situation and the drawer in a fictitious payee situation,
the Code neglected to take into account an essential fact: the
drawer is not always a wrongdoer. Whereas in subsections (b)
and (c) of section 3-405 the drawer is by definition "guilty,"" l
subsection (a) does not require actual wrongdoing on the part
of the drawer.8 2 In the latter case, the drawer may have asked
for identification carefully and been satisfied that the imper-
sonator was the one he purported to be. Should the impostor
at that point present the check for payment and be asked for
no proof of identification at all by the bank, a strict applica-
tion of section 3-405 would place the loss on the only party
who has exercised care, leaving the negligent party completely
absolved of liability.
For those cases in which the drawer actually has been
negligent, and for all fictitious payee cases, the uniform rule
79 U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(a). See note 10 supra for the text of this subsection.
80 The "padded payroll" cases are somewhat different in that the drawer himself
is innocent of fraudulent behavior. The employer nonetheless is deemed responsible
for the wrongful behavior of the employee who has fraudulently supplied the ficti-
tious name to the drawer.
81 U.C.C. §§ 3-405(1)(b), (c) provide that the drawer (or his agent or employee)
must "intend" that the payee have no interest in the instrument. See note 1 supra for
the full text of § 3-405.
82 U.C.C. § 3-405(1)(a) states merely that the drawer must have been "induced"
to issue the instrument.
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which places liability on the drawer is well-tailored. Even
though the bank may in some cases have been more negligent
than the drawer, the Code policy of simplifying commercial
transactions would be defeated completely if courts were re-
quired in every instance to determine which was the more cul-
pable party. However, section 3-405's mechanical approach
should not be followed in those cases in which the drawer has
not acted negligently or fraudulently and in which the bank
has violated reasonable commercial standards. The basic as-
sumption of wrongdoing underlying section 3-405 has no ap-
plication in these cases. Under such circumstances, a court
should not hesitate to place the loss on the negligent party,
the bank.
This approach is consistent with pre-Code law.s3 More-
over, it does not defeat the Code's purpose of simplicity, since
the determination to be made is not the difficult one of who
was the more negligent party but merely that of whether ei-
ther party exercised any care at all.e4 When examined in light
of reasons expressed by courts which have refused to apply a
negligence standard in section 3-405, this approach is quite
acceptable. In Fair Park, 5 the court's concern was that the
loss be borne by the party better able to control the loss. As
between a drawer who has exercised care and a bank which
8$ See the text accompanying notes 12-25 supra for a discussion of pre-Code law.
This was the approach taken by Professor Abel in analyzing impostor cases
decided before the existence of the U.C.C.:
Ours is instead the easier task of reporting whether in the cases there has
been any care at all exercised by the parties. This approach removes all
occasion for entering upon a comparison of the care exercised by the vic-
tims where both have been careful; solution of that difficult, if not impossi-
ble, problem as to which of two persons differently circumstanced has been
the more or the less diligent is pretermitted in favor of a determination as
to whether either has been at all careful.
Abel I, supra note 11, at 188. Professor Abel further noted that the kind of "care"
contemplated by these cases was the resort to independent sources of information to
establish the identity of the impostor. Id. at 189.
This comment is limited to circumstances in which one or both of the parties to
the impostor transaction are negligent. However, where both parties have exercised
care in their dealings with the impostor, most pre-Code courts allowed the loss to fall
upon the first party to deal with the impostor the drawer. Id. at 191-92. U.C.C. § 3-
405 does not change this result and in fact provides a simple, straightforward method
for resolving such cases.
85 541 S.W.2d at 269-70.
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has exercised none, the bank is obviously in a better position
to avoid the loss. Furthermore, such an approach would not
hamper the negotiability of instruments, a fear expressed by
the Dartmouth court.88 Since the drawer exercised care in is-
suing his check, it would be futile to place the loss on him as a
deterrent. Placing the los§' on the bank, however, would lead
to an exercise of greater care on the part of bank employees.
Finally, if a goal of the Code provision is, as implied in com-
ment 4 to section 3-405, to place the risk upon the party bet-
ter able to bear the loss,8 7 then this approachis certainly pref-
erable. In most instances, an individual defrauded by an
impostor will have no insurance to cover the loss. A bank, on
the other hand, handles such losses as a routine matter. It is
certainly in a much better position than the average individ-
ual to recover from the theft resulting from an imposture.
Applied to the facts in Crisp, this approach will allow the
bank to charge Crisp's account for the loss due to the impos-
ture. Despite Crisp's age and physical condition, he was ad-
mittedly negligent. Although an individual like Crisp would
probably not be able to absorb such losses as well as a bank,
this approach could result in a greater exercise of care on the
part of individuals dealing with strangers in commercial
transactions.
CONCLUSION
The conflict over the role of negligence in section 3-405
developed out of a desire to resolve the inequities which result
from a mechanical application of the provision. Section 3-405,
based on the assumption that the drawer of the instrument, or
his agent or employee, has been negligent or fraudulent, can
be validly applied in those situations in which the drawer is
indeed a wrongdoer. Such a result is certainly merited in ficti-
tious payee cases in which the drawer or his agent has drawn
" Dartmouth Nat'l Bank v. Keene Nat'l Bank, 115 A.2d 316, 318 (N.H. 1955).
Note that Dartmouth expressly stated that the loss might properly be placed on the
second victim of the imposture where the first victim exercised care and the second
victim exercised none. Id. at 319. See text accompanying note 48 supra for a discus-
sion of this case.
87 U.C.C. § 3-405, comment 4. See note 31 supra for the text of comment 4.
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a check fully intending that the payee take no interest
therein. Even if the bank has been negligent in the ensuing
transaction, absent its actual bad faith the drawer is the
guilty party and should bear the loss. Impostor cases, unlike
their fictitious payee counterparts, come in two varieties:
those in which the drawer was actually negligent and those in
which the drawer used reasonable care to attempt to discover
the identity of his transferee. Where the drawer was negligent,
section 3-405's risk allocation provision can be applied
straightforwardly. Although a jury might determine that the
bank was actually more negligent than the drawer, such a de-
termination could be complicated and costly. Despite the ulti-
mate fairness of this approach, it does not outweigh the
Code's objective of simplifying the law of commercial
transactions.
In those cases in which the drawer was careful in at-
tempting to ascertain the identity of the impostor, however,
while the bank exercised no care at all, a system which places
the loss on the innocent drawer while absolving the guilty
party of liability is unjustified. The drafters of the Code obvi-
ously did not intend such a result. The approach to section 3-
405 suggested here, which would place the loss on the drawer
in all cases except those where the drawer exercised care and
the bank exercised none, is desirable in that it continues the
common law approach to impostor and fictitious payee cases.
In addition, it tends to place the loss on the party better able
to prevent the loss and furthers the goal of free transferability
of commercial paper. Finally, and most importantly, it strikes
an even balance between the Code's purpose of simplifying
the law of commercial transactions and the courts' desire to
insure that all parties are treated fairly.
Winifred Bryant
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